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The paper provides an extension and a new proof of Deaton￿ s the-
orem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation when income
taxes are a¢ ne and preferences over consumption goods are separable
from labour-leisure choices, homothetic, and identical across agents.




A well known result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) shows that, under cer-
tain homogeneity and separability assumptions on preferences, an optimal
system of taxes for public-sector funding or for redistribution relies on di-
rect taxation only. Deaton (1979) has shown that, if income tax schedules
are restricted to be a¢ ne, the conclusion of Atkinson and Stiglitz remains
valid under the additional assumption that preferences are homothetic in
the consumption goods. Deaton￿ s result plays a role in the literature on the
undesirability of capital income taxation in the presence of an a¢ ne income
tax schedule, e.g., Werning (2007).
This note provides a new proof and an extension of Deaton￿ s result.
Whereas Deaton focussed on optimal a¢ ne income taxes, the analysis here
￿I thank Felix Bierbrauer, Christoph Engel, and Andreas Nicklisch for very helpful
comments on a previous draft of this note.
1shows that,under his assumptions, any tax system with a¢ ne income taxes
and nonuniform linear excise taxes is Pareto-dominated by a tax system
with a¢ ne income taxes only and no excise taxes at all. The proof uses an
argument that Kaplow (2006) and Laroque (2005) have recently developed
to simplify the proof and extend the scope of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem
itself. For Deaton￿ s theorem, the argument provides a more direct access
to the relation between the assumption that preferences are homothetic in
the consumption goods and the requirement that the income tax schedule
be a¢ ne.
2 The Setup
Consider an economy with m ￿nal goods, one intermediate good, and labour.
The ￿nal goods are produced from the intermediate good, the intermediate
good from labour. Di⁄erent agents have di⁄erent productivities. One unit of
￿nal good i requires pi units of the intermediate good. One unit of the inter-
mediate good requires 1
t units of labour from an agent with productivity t:
An agent with productivity t who has ￿nal-good consumption c1;:::;cm and
who provides the labour input ‘ =
y
t that is required to produce the amount
y of the intermediate good, gets the utility u(c1;:::;cm;
y
t): The utility func-
tion u is continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing in c1;:::;cm; decreasing in
‘ =
y
t; and strictly quasi-concave.
An allocation is a mapping t ! (c1(t);:::;cm(t);y(t)) that indicates for
each t how much of each ￿nal good an agent with productivity parameter
t gets to consume and how much of the intermediate good he has to sup-
ply. The allocation (c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿)) involves the aggregate consumption R
ci(t)dF(t) of ￿nal good i and aggregate production
R
y(t)dF(t) of the
intermediate good, where F is the cross-section distribution of t in the pop-








If the inequality in (1) is strict, I will say that the allocation is strictly
feasible.
An allocation (c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿)) is implementable by the income tax
schedule T(￿) with consumer prices q1;:::;qm if, for every t; (c1(t);:::;cm(t);y(t))




qici ￿ y ￿ T(y): (2)
Trivially, an allocation that is implementable by an income tax schedule T(￿)








for all t and t0:
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), as well as Kaplow (2006) and Laroque








where v is continuous and ’ is continuous and increasing: Under this as-









where, for each t;
w(t) := ’(c1(t);:::;cm(t)): (6)
Incentive compatibility depends only on the output requirement y(t)and
the subutility w(t) that is given by (6). Which consumption vector is
used to achieve the subutility w(t) is irrelevant for incentive compatibil-
ity, but matters for feasibility. If ￿nal-goods consumption vectors can be
rearranged so as to reduce resource costs while achieving the same subutil-
ity levels, one can replace the incentive-compatible and feasible allocation
(c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿)) by a payo⁄-equivalent allocation that is also incentive-
compatible and strictly feasible. If the surplus that is thereby achieved can
be used to raise utility levels without upsetting incentive compatibility, the
allocation (c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿)) is strictly dominated. By the taxation princi-
ple of Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995), the payo⁄-equivalent and the
dominating allocation can both be implemented by an income tax schedule
with the consumer prices p1;:::;pm:
3 A Generalization of Deaton￿ s Theorem
In the preceding argument, there is no restriction on the tax schedule that
implements the dominating allocation. To deal with the additional restric-
tion that the tax schedule must be a¢ ne, Deaton imposes the additional
3assumption that ’ is homothetic. Under this assumption, he shows that any
allocation that maximizes welfare subject to feasibility and implementability
by an a¢ ne income tax schedule must involve consumer prices equal to the
producer prices p1;:::;pm: The following result shows that, in fact, any allo-
cation that is implemented by an a¢ ne income tax schedule with consumer
prices that are not proportional to the producer prices is Pareto-dominated.
This generalizes Deaton￿ s theorem in the same way that Kaplow (2006) and
Laroque (2005) generalized the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem.
Theorem 1 Assume that u takes the separable form (4) where ’ is ho-
mothetic. Let (c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿)) be any feasible allocation that is im-
plementable by an a¢ ne income tax schedule T(￿) with consumer prices
q1;:::;qm. If the consumer prices q1;:::;qm are not proportional to the pro-
ducer prices p1;:::;pm, the allocation (c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿)) is strictly Pareto-
dominated by another feasible allocation that can be implemented by an a¢ ne
income tax schedule ^ T(￿) with consumer prices equal to the producer prices
p1;:::;pm:
Proof. I ￿rst show that,if the consumer prices q1;:::;qm are not propor-
tional to the producer prices p1;:::;pm, there exists a strictly feasible allo-
cation which provides participants with the same payo⁄s as the allocation






pici s.t. ’(c1;:::;cm) = w(t); (7)
where w(t) is given by (6). The allocation (^ c1(￿);:::;^ cm(￿);y(￿)) is payo⁄








Indeed, because u is strictly quasi-concave and di⁄erentiable and because the
consumer price ratios qi=qj are not all the same as the producer price ratios
pi=pj; the inequality in (8) must be strict. If the allocation (c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿)) is
feasible, the allocation (^ c1(￿);:::; ^ cm(￿);y(￿)) must be strictly feasible.
I next show that the allocation (^ c1(￿);:::;^ cm(￿);y(￿)) can be implemented
by an a¢ ne income tax schedule ^ T(￿); with consumer prices equal to p1;:::;pm:
I begin by specifying the schedule ^ T(￿): The assumption that (c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿))
can be implemented by the tax schedule T(￿) with consumer prices q1;:::;qm
implies that, for each t; the vector (c1(t);:::;cm(t)) maximizes ’(c1;:::;cm)
4under the constraint that (2) hold for y = y(t): By the homotheticity of ’;
it follows that (c1(t);:::;cm(t)) and w(t) take the form
ci(t) = (y(t) ￿ T(y(t))) ￿i; for i = 1;:::;m;
and
w(t) =  (y(t) ￿ T(y(t)))’(￿1;:::;￿m)
where (￿1;:::;￿m) maximizes ’(c1;:::;cm) under the constraint
Pm
i=1 qici ￿
1: Also by the homotheticity of ’; the de￿nition of (^ c1(t);:::;^ cm(t)) as the
solution to problem (7) implies that (^ c1(t);:::;^ cm(t)) takes the form
^ ci(t) = (y(t) ￿ T(y(t))) ^ ￿i; for i = 1;:::;m; (9)
where (^ ￿1;:::; ^ ￿m) minimizes
Pm
i=1 pici under the constraint
’(c1;:::;cm) = ’(￿1;:::;￿m):
Given the vector (^ ￿1;:::; ^ ￿m) and given that the tax schedule T(￿) takes the
form T(y) = ￿0 + ￿1y; I write ^ T(y) := ^ ￿0 + ^ ￿1y; where
^ ￿0 := ￿0
m X
i=1




From the speci￿cations of T(￿) and ^ T(￿); one obviously has




for all t: From (9) and (10), one sees that, for any t; the vector (^ c1(t);:::;^ cm(t);y(t))
satis￿es the budget constraint (2) when the tax schedule is ^ T(￿) and the con-
sumer prices are p1;:::;pm:








for any outcome (c1;:::;cm;y) that satis￿es the consumer￿ s budget constraint
when the tax schedule is ^ T(￿) and the consumer prices are p1;:::;pm. By the
de￿nitions of (^ ￿1;:::; ^ ￿m) and of the tax schedule ^ T(￿) and by homotheticity,
any such outcome satis￿es
’(c1;:::;cm) ￿  
 




’(^ ￿1;:::; ^ ￿m)
=  (y ￿ T(y))’(￿1;:::;￿m)
= ’((y ￿ T(y))￿1;:::;(y ￿ T(y))￿m): (13)
5Because
Pm
i=1 qi￿i ￿ 1; the vector ((y ￿ T(y))￿1;:::;(y ￿ T(y))￿m;y) sat-
is￿es the budget constraint (2). Because T(￿) and q1;:::;qm implement the
allocation (c1(￿);:::;cm(￿);y(￿));







Upon combining (13) and (14) and using the fact that the allocations (c1(￿);:::;
cm(￿);y(￿)) and (^ c1(￿);:::;^ cm(￿);y(￿)) generate the same utility, one obtains
(12).
To conclude the proof of Theorem 1, I note that, because u is strictly
quasi-concave, the solution to the problem of maximizing u under the con-
straint (2) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters of the
tax schedule. A small reduction in ^ ￿0 can therefore be used to redistribute
some of the surplus that is available under the strictly feasible allocation
(^ c1(￿);:::;^ cm(￿);y(￿)). This makes everybody better o⁄ without violating
feasibility.
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